Abstract: This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant's model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröbe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant's views on these issues. I then develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kant's theory of perception as elaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I show how this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficulties raised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kant's position by considering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one way to make sense of Kant's argument is by juxtaposing it with Russell's response to Bradley's regress; I focus in particular on the concept of 'unity'. Finally, I offer, in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant in Sections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kant's account has significant strengths, a number of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps.
Conceptualism, Imagination and Atomism
I want to begin by introducing three issues which are central to KrV itself, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception and intentionality. This section will sketch those issues and provide a brief overview of my ultimate line of argument.
The first issue is the relationship between perception, intuition and the understanding. 'Perceptions', for Kant, are conscious representations (KrV: A320/B376-7).
1 My interest is in a subset of perceptions: those which 'refer' [sich beziehen] to an 'object' [Gegenstand] either 'immediately', in the case of intuitions, or, in the case of concepts, 'mediately, by means of a mark . . . common to several things' (KrV: A320/B376-7). This subset of conscious representations, be they intuitions or concepts, thus possesses intentionality: Kant accordingly refers to them, in contrast to mere 'sensations', as 'objective [objective] perceptions' (KrV: A320/B376-7). The question I wish to highlight is this: to what degree does Kant regard these various modes of intentionality as separable? For example, is the representation of spatio-temporal particulars possible in the complete absence of conceptual capacities? Let 'non-conceptualism' refer to those positions which My interest, in particular, is in what seems the most plausible analysis of Kant's position: the proposal, as Longuenesse put it, is that understanding operates as the 'rule-giver for the syntheses of imagination' (Longuenesse 1998: 63) . Let me unpack this. Given the results of the Analogies, all of nature is governed by rules: every event thus 'presupposes something on which it follows in accordance with a rule' (KrV: A189). However, Kant contends, only rational beings are capable of representing rules, i.e. of representing normative requirements within the content of their intentional states (GMS: 413) Such representations are made possible by the understanding: as Ginsborg incisively summarizes, 'to say that synthesis involves understanding is simply to say that it involves a consciousness of normativity' (Ginsborg 2008: 71) . Given this, the proposal is as follows. The reason Kant initially attributes synthesis to imagination is simply that the basic form which such synthesis takes is associative: animals thus possess imagination and so 'connect representations according to the laws of sensibility' (V-MP-L1/Pölitz: 275-7). In rational agents alone, however, this associative synthesis is governed, or as Longuenesse puts it 'appropriated', by an awareness of normativity (Longuenesse 1998: 207) . To take the simplest case, to conceptualize an object, for example as a body, is to represent certain properties as necessarily attaching to it, for example impenetrability. My recall or 'reproduction' of these properties is thus governed by the normative demands of the understanding (KrV: A106). Since Kant believes this capacity for recall or 'reproduction' to be the work of imagination, it follows that the understanding is the 'rule-giver for the syntheses of imagination'. While attractive, this model of the relationship between understanding and imagination remains, however, underdeveloped. I will outline a number of ways in which Kant's work provides the material for such a development.
The final topic in play is perceptual atomism. Consider the Analogies. Kant's argument there is premised on the claim that 'the apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive' (KrV: A189/B234). This premise is vital to Kant's case: it is this premise which undercuts what one might call the naïve view of time-determination, a view on which I can simply see that an event has taken place, and so legitimates an appeal to the categories in order to re-construct the distinction between successive perception and the perception of succession. The problem, however, is that this initial premise seems less than compelling: why can I not simply see, at a single glance, the simultaneously existing parts of a house just as I seem able to see, at a single glance, both a computer and a pen on my desk? Lewis White Beck (1978: 144) provides a clear formulation of the problem:
Kant assumes that the manifold of representations is always successive. This is certainly wrong. When I open my eyes I do not scan the visual field as if my eyes or my attention worked like the electron ejector in a television tube, aiming first at one point and then at an adjacent point. But as a consequence of his sensational atomism, Kant assumes that my apprehension does work in this way.
The difficulty is not confined to the Analogies. To take another case, Kant states that I 'cannot represent any line, no matter how small, without drawing it in thought, i.e. successively generating all the parts from one point' (KrV: A162/ B203). But as Van Cleve has emphasized this seems simply false: I can surely picture a line instantly (Van Cleve 1999: 86) . Van Cleve reinforces the point with another example:
Imagine a page full of circles. Which circles did you fill in first, those in the top half or the bottom half? If you are like me, you set the whole array down at once. Even if you filled in one half of the page first, I bet you put down the individual circles whole, rather than generating them point by point. (Van Cleve 1999: 279n41) The risk is that, precisely as Husserl and Heidegger later alleged, Kant has simply distorted the phenomenological evidence in order to provide a platform for the proof of the categories: if this is the case, that proof itself is open to rejection. I will argue that Kant's account contains a powerful response to such concerns, a response that feeds directly into the two issues sketched above.
I have emphasized the exegetical and philosophical centrality of three topics within Kant's theory of intentionality: the status of conceptualism, of imagination and of atomism. This paper obviously makes no pretence to provide a complete treatment of these areas. My aim, rather, is to shed some fresh light on them by focusing on the relationship between Kant's conceptions of perception, of magnitude and of synthesis. Section 2 will introduce and develop the relevant aspects of his position, drawing in particular on KU. Using this framework, I contrast, in Section 3, Kant's argument in the Axioms of Intuition with the response developed by Russell to Bradley's attack on relations. This allows me, in Section 4, to pinpoint both the strengths and weaknesses of Kant's position with respect to the three topics I have sketched; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition, in particular Husserl and Heidegger, may plausibly be seen as responding to those weaknesses.
Kant on Perception, Apprehension and the 'Basic Measure'
In the A Deduction Kant introduces the 'synthesis of apprehension' by making the following claims:
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity. (KrV: A99) I want to begin by unpacking the various points made here. 'Every intuition contains a manifold' because Kant holds that space and time, the forms of intuition, are quanta continua: i.e. 'no part of them is the smallest (no part is Sacha Golob 4 simple)' (KrV: A169/B211). Any intuition can thus be subdivided into a manifold of parts. This naturally raises the following question: why do my perceptions represent one particular level of decomposition as opposed to another? The core of Kant's answer lies in his conception of a 'basic measure' [Grundmaß] which we 'take in directly in one intuition' [in einer Anschauung unmittelbar fassen] (KU: 251). To explain this central aspect of Kant's theory of intentionality, I need to address three inter-related points, each of which makes only limited sense when viewed in isolation; I would therefore ask for the reader's patience until all three are in place. The first is the relationship between space and time. The term 'basic measure' refers for Kant to the explanatorily primitive capacity for the representation of a determinate spatial extent: by 'explanatorily primitive' here I mean not that this capacity depends upon no other capacities but that it depends upon no prior ability to represent particular spaces.
10 More specifically, the basic measure may be understood as a unit of spatial representation: it consists in the representation of a specific spatial extent, for example, the height of a man (KU: 256). Now, time, for Kant, is the 'form of inner sense', i.e. it is the form in which the subject intuits its own act of spatial representation:
[W]e cannot even represent time itself without, in drawing a straight line (which has to serve as the external figurative representation of time), attending merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold . . . Motion, as the action of the subject (not as a determination of an object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space . . . first produces the concept of succession. (KrV: B154-5) 11 Given that the basic measure is the primitive mechanism by which the spatial determination of the manifold occurs, it follows that it is the iteration of the basic measure which generates the representation of succession; each particular instance of the basic measure correlates to 'one moment in time'. 12 It is for this reason, in part, that Kant describes the basic measure as a 'quantum' or that which 'I can cognize immediately', i.e., as A99 puts it, 'in one moment' (V-MP/Dohna: 630). 13 This brings me to the second point, the connection to consciousness. Kant typically distinguishes between representations and representations of which the agent is conscious: the latter, as noted in Section 1, constitute perceptions (KrV: A320/B376-7). The illustrations he gives of unconscious representations are mereological. To represent a man, for example, is to represent 'his eyes, nose, mouth, etc.' since 'the representation of the whole (of the head or of the human being) is composed of these partial ideas'; nevertheless 'I am not conscious' of these various parts (Anth.: 135) . What determines then that of which we are conscious? Kant's answer is the synthesis of apprehension. Specifically, we are conscious of those parts which have been distinguished within the manifold by temporal succession: to say that 'as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity' is just to say that we are not conscious of the component parts of any instantaneous representation. The initial answer Kant gives is the imagination (KU 251-2). As noted in Section 1, Kant holds that non-rational but conscious subjects are, like any other part of nature, governed entirely by laws. In the case of animals, for example, the imagination would thus determine a basic measure entirely as a result of causal factors. These will include the animal's biology-an animal that preys on insects and one that preys on large mammals will typically employ a different basic measure. These factors will also include context: in looking at the pyramids, to use Kant's own example, one tends to employ the ready-made measure provided by 'the stones on top of one another'; similarly, the measure used when standing on top of a hill will obviously differ from that employed when in a small, enclosed room. 14 In the case of rational agents, however, the understanding is able to determine the nature of the measure employed:
If, for example, a savage [Wilder] sees a house from a distance, whose use he does not know, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who knows it determinately as a dwelling established for humans. But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two cases. With one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at the same time. (Log.: 33) The savage lacks what Kant calls a 'rule of apprehension', i.e. an awareness of certain norms, i.e. concepts as defined in Section 1, which inform the perceptual process by determining what is to be 'apprehended' or, equivalently, what basic measure is used. 15 To put the point crudely, there is no reason for the savage to employ the basic measure <house> as opposed to, say, a basic measure <land-scape> within which the house would be no more significant than any other component part of the terrain such as the rocks to its left or the empty field to its right. No doubt Kant's educated audience would, likewise, miss many features of the same scene that would be immediately salient to the 'savage'. Suppose, further, that the 'savage' only employs the basic measure <landscape> and no other. In that case, he will intuit the house but he will not be conscious of it, or 'perceive' it in Kant's sense of that term, any more than I 'perceive' each timber on the dwelling's porch. In practice, of course, the savage is likely to perceive the house even while lacking the relevant concept: this is because the imagination will recognize it as an unusual or even simply physically striking feature of the scene and thus, at some point, suggest an appropriate 'basic measure'. Insofar as the savage is rational, he will, unlike an animal, possess the further ability to 'reflect on' the features of this new 'basic measure' and thus, ultimately, to arrive himself at the concept of a house. 16 The sketch of Kant's theory of perception given here obviously requires further development. Nevertheless, one can see how it relates directly to the issues introduced in Section 1. First, the account of the basic measure provides a concrete example of the interaction between imagination and understanding, and of the way in which capacities which function purely causally in animals, in this case the selection of a primitive unit of spatial perception, may be 'appropriated' by the normative awareness characteristic of the understanding. Indeed, I agree with Longuenesse and Allison that the 'rule of apprehension' is functionally equivalent to KrV's schema: both are rules 'for the determination of our intuition in accordance with some universal concept' (KrV: A141/B180).
17
Second, this sketch sheds some light on the issue of atomism. Recall Van Cleve's claim: if asked to imagine a page of circles, 'I bet you put down the individual circles whole, rather than generating them point by point' (Van Cleve 1999: 279n41). As I noted, this seems phenomenologically indisputable. But it is also perfectly in line with Kant's theory. His theory of inner sense entails that any iteration of the basic measure must occur successively; but there is no reason why the basic measure itself cannot be a whole circle. Similarly, in the case of the Second Analogy, Kant need not deny that, suitably positioned, we can intuit a whole section of the river or both the roof and base of a house 'at a single glance' [in einem Blick] (KU: 254). His point is that, insofar as I do intuit both the upstream and downstream positions simultaneously, I cannot be conscious of them: the 'basic unit' in such a case would be something like <whole-river>. Thus the premise needed for the Second Analogy is not that simultaneous representation is impossible but simply that 'the representations of the parts succeed one another' (KrV: A189/B234 emphasis added).
With this preliminary sketch of Kant's position and of its relevance for the issues discussed in Section 1 in place, I want to focus on the question of conceptualism and the potential separability of perception and understanding. I argue that Kant's position can best grasped by contrasting the theory outlined here with what F. H. Bradley called 'my difficulty as to "unities" ' (Bradley 1911: 74) .
Bradley, Russell and the B Deduction
In its simplest form, Bradley's 'difficulty as to "unities"' is this:
Is there anything, I ask, in a unity beside its 'constituents' . . . and, if there is anything more, in what does this 'more' consist? (Bradley 1911: 74) Bradley's problem, and in particular its implications for the status of relations, was a key factor in the development of the early Analytic tradition: the young Russell held that its solution would be 'the most valuable contribution which a modern philosopher could possibly make to philosophy' (Russell 1990: 145) . 18 Within the early Analytic context, Bradley's challenge was typically treated in connection with the proposition. Thus Russell's 1903 formulation, for instance:
Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude and the Unity of Perception
Consider, for example, the proposition 'A differs from B'. The constituents of this proposition, if we analyse it, appear to be only 'A, difference, B'. Yet these constituents, thus placed side by side, do not reconstitute the proposition. It may be said that we ought, in the analysis, to mention the relations which difference has to A and B . . . These relations consist in the fact that A is referent and B relatum with respect to difference.
[But] 'A, referent, difference, relatum, B' is still merely a list of terms, not a proposition. (Russell 1903: §54) 19 Russell's point is that no set of propositional constituents or 'terms' seems itself sufficient to generate the requisite unity. In particular, the addition of relations to such a list serves, prima facie, simply to yield a longer list: 'loves' when added to the names 'Desdemona' and 'Cassio', would itself be only another 'brick in the structure, not the cement' (Russell 1912: 74) . The result, Bradley predicted, is that 'we are hurried off into the eddy of a hopeless process, since we are forced to go on finding new relations without end' (Bradley 1893: 27-8) .
One can see how the central texts of the early Analytic period line up against this backdrop. Russell's Theory of Knowledge manuscript, for example, attempts to avoid the regress by denying that that which supplies the relevant unity, namely 'logical form', is itself part of the 'list' of terms:
[The logical form] cannot be a new constituent, for if it were . . . we find ourselves embarked on an endless regress. It is obvious, in fact, that when all the constituents of a complex have been enumerated, there remains something which may be called the 'form' of the complex, which is the way in which the constituents are combined in the complex. (Russell 1992: 98) Bradley's own proposed solution may be treated as a type of semantic holism. Of course, in the case of Bradley, of his respondents Moore and Russell, and indeed of Kant himself the semantic is inseparable from the ontological; but I focus for simplicity's sake on the former dimension alone. Confining myself, further, to the level of propositions as opposed to the entire 'Absolute', Bradley's proposal is that explanatory priority be granted to the proposition as a whole from which the individual components are merely 'false abstractions' (Bradley 1893: 32) . 20 I agree with Linsky that Frege's appeal to a special class of 'unsaturated' propositional constituents is plausibly seen as an acceptance of the same explanatory primacy of the 'complete thought' (Linsky 1992: 268) . But how exactly does all this connect to Kant? There are obvious links between Kant's position on the unity of judgment and both the Fregean and the various Russellian stories: with respect to the former, for example, Sluga in particular has argued that Kant's doctrine that concepts are possible predicates should be aligned with the context principle (Sluga 1980: 90-5) . My interest, however, is not, at least primarily, in Kant's account of the unity of judgment but in his account of the unity of perception. Specifically, my concern is with the claim, Sacha Golob 8 made in the Axioms of Intuition, that the 'unity' of perception depends on 'the concept of a magnitude', the schema of which is 'number' (KrV: A142/B182, A161/B202-3). I want now to consider the argument of the Axioms: my emphasis will be on its implications for the issues treated above.
I argued in Section 2 that Kant's theory of perception should be understood in terms of the concept of a 'basic measure'. The 'basic measure' delineates the spatial extent of individual, empirical perceptions. Suppose now that I have an 'entire series of perceptions' (KrV: A121). Figure 1 may help to illustrate the case.
The various perceptual contents here are the various iterations of the 'basic measure'; in line with Section 2, this iteration necessarily occurs at successive moments in time. I have, however, simplified matters in two ways. First, I represent only what Kant calls the 'formal' aspects of the basic measure: its extension in space and time. Clearly my perception normally contains more content than this: the basic measure will not be a line segment but a man or a house. 21 Second, the basic measures in Figure 1 are shown as all being the same size. As stated in Section 2, this need not be the case: if I look down at my map and then up at the mountain, the extent of the basic measure has changed radically in those two moments. Granting these simplifications, Kant wishes to raise an important question. As they stand, these perceptions are 'dispersed and separate in the mind' (KrV: A120). The question then is how they are to be unified or combined?
Why is this question important-why does it matter if these perceptions remain as illustrated in Figure 1 ? In answering, it is important to stress that Kant does not hold that such unification is a necessary condition on the occurrence or identity of the individual perceptions; in the language of the early Analytic period, Kant does not hold that the relations between the various perceptions are internal or constitutive. Thus the combination in question is an instance of 'composition' [Zusammenhang] precisely because it concerns the 'synthesis of a manifold of what does not necessarily belong to each other' (KrV: B202n). The potential for confusion stems from the complexity of Kant's mereology. Kant frequently distinguishes between aggregates, in which the parts have explanatory priority over the whole, and systems, in which the whole has explanatory priority over the parts. 22 In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant argues that the relationship between the forms of intuition, on the one hand, and individual spaces and times, on the other, is of the latter type: this conclusion is designed to refute models, such as Locke's or, ironically, Leibniz's, on which the representations of space and time are pieced together by an experience of multiple 
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Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude and the Unity of Perception 9 individual places or durations. 23 In the case of determinate space and times, however, the mereology is reversed: the parts which make up any particular spatio-temporal extent have explanatory priority over it. Thus Kant holds that insofar as we are conscious of appearances they are necessarily 'extensive magnitudes' (KrV: A161/B202):
I call an extensive magnitude that in which the representation of the parts makes possible the representation of the whole (and therefore necessarily precedes the latter). (KrV: A162/B203) So, the unity of the perceptual series is not a necessary condition on the occurrence of its individual members. Nevertheless, one can see that some form of combination is necessary if intentionality is not to be radically impoverished: without such combination, each perception figures only at its own moment of occurrence, with the result that earlier perceptions are unable to inform later ones. The minimal required form of combination is thus what Kant calls 'reproduction': without this I would, at each successive moment, 'always lose the preceding representations' (KrV: A102). The result of such reproduction may be represented by Figure 2 .
I use the square brackets in Figure 2 to represent the idea that the informational content of the various past representations is, in some sense, co-accessible at the single moment T6. Here the recalled items are simply the line segments seen at T1-T5 but what is reproduced will typically be governed by either the laws of association or, in the case of rational agents, by an awareness of norms (recall Section 2 on the 'rule of apprehension'). Kant attributes the capacity for reproduction, which is obviously close to what we would call 'memory', to the imagination (KrV: A100). Now, Kant's account of reproduction is, undoubtedly, underdeveloped. It is worth, however, responding briefly to one objection, raised by Van Cleve: if we are able to simultaneously access multiple parts in memory, why cannot we simply do so in perception, thus reinstating what I called, in Section 1, the naïve view of time-determination? 24 But this is unfair: it seems reasonable to start from the assumption that perception and memory are distinct modalities such that the 'access', and the laws governing it, characteristic of the former is unlikely to be identical to the 'access', and the laws governing it, characteristic of the latter. I return to this in Section 4, but, for the moment, I want simply to grant that Kant either has, or can develop, some viable explanation of the shift from Figure 1 to Figure 2 .
I stated in Section 1 that the second half of the B Deduction claims that even perception is, in some sense, dependent upon the understanding. One can now 
Figure 2
Sacha Golobsee why this claim is problematic. On the one hand, as an aggregate, there is no mode of determinate combination such that it is a necessary condition on the existence of the individual perceptions that they enter into it: the situation shown in Figure 1 thus cannot be dependent on the understanding since Kant defines the latter precisely as a capacity for certain forms of combination. 25 On the other hand, the picture given in Figure 2 is intended, at least in part, to capture the way in which animals are able to associate, say, the sound of a bell with a feeling of hunger; but since animals lack understanding for Kant, Figure 2 cannot be dependent on the understanding either.
I want now to present Kant's solution to this dilemma. The key is to recognize that, in virtue of the aggregative mereology of determinate spatial representations, the problem Kant faces in explaining the unity of perception is analogous to that facing Russell given the atomism of the Principles: in both cases the aim is to explain a unification which is not a necessary condition on the identity of the relevant perceptions or terms.
26 Now, as with more familiar proofs such as the Second Analogy, the Axioms are intended to establish a transcendental condition on a particular intentional achievement. In the case of the Axioms, the relevant intentional achievement, I suggest, is this: the mereological integration of multiple perceptions. Let me explain. Suppose I walk closer to a particular patch of ground, seeing first the grass, then a snake, before coming close enough to perceive its fangs. On Kant's model of perception, what is changing here is the 'basic measure': I am initially conscious of a whole, the patch of ground, and then progressively conscious, in line with the results of Section 2, of its constituent parts. But what I lack, in the absence of conceptuality, is any way to represent the parts as parts of the whole. Even if I reproduce the parts, as in Figure 2 , all I have, to use Russell's term, is a 'list' of perceptions, one after another. Note also, exactly as in Russell's case, that no additional perception can resolve the problem-any more than adding another relation to the set of propositional constituents will resolve Bradley's regress. The bluntest way to put the point is this. Suppose the line segments in Figure 2 are the parts of one vast line. Figure 2 , however, does not represent them as such; it represents a mere 'heap' [Haufen] of line segments just as Russell's 'lists' were bricks without cement (KrV: A121 ; Russell 1912: 74) . Furthermore, it is clear that adding additional components will not suffice to represent the vast line but simply yields an expanded list. The problem, in short, is how one gets from Figure 2 to This brings me to Kant's solution: the only way to represent 'the synthetic unity of this manifold' is via an appeal to a distinct semantic capability: namely,
Time: T6
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Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude and the Unity of Perceptiona second-order capacity to form 'representations of our representations' based on their shared properties (KrV: A68/B94). 27 Kant holds that this second order capacity has certain innate forms. The relevant one here is the schema of magnitude:
[T]he pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis), as a concept of the understanding, is number, a representation which compounds [zusammenbefaßt] the successive addition of homogeneous units. Number is therefore simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the intuition. (KrV: A142-3/B182) Kant expands on the point in the 1793 Prize essay:
For we can represent a determinate space to ourselves in no other way than by drawing it, i.e., by adding one space to the other, and so also with time.
Now the representation of a composite, as such, is not a mere intuition, but requires the concept of a composition [Zusammensetzung] , so far as it is applied to intuition in space and time. So this concept (along with that of its opposite, the simple), is one that is not abstracted from intuitions, as a partial representation contained in them, but is a basic concept, and a priori at that. (FM: 271)
To possess the pure schema 'number' is simply to possess an awareness of the line segments illustrated in Figure 2 as homogenous units, an awareness which is in turn both necessary and sufficient, at least for Kant, to allow the representation of their combination or composition through summing them (KrV: A164/ B205). Their composition thus occurs by means of the representation of number, which itself 'consists solely in the consciousness of the unity . . . of the successive synthesis of units [Einheiten]' (KrV: A103). 28 As Longuenesse (2005: 44) neatly puts it:
When we measure a line by adding units of measurement, what we do in effect is recognize in the line a plurality of elements thought under the same concept: line segment equal to segment s.
'Segment s' here corresponds to the 'basic measure'. Kant's claim is, in short, that the capacity to integrate determinate spatio-temporal parts and wholes, the capacity to represent those parts as units, and the capacity to employ the concept of number are inter-defined and inter-dependent. This conceptual awareness need not, as Kant himself makes clear, yield an explicit or 'reflected' act of judgment: it rather consists, at least primarily, in the possession of a 'rule for apprehension' (KrV: A103-4). Of course, the categories are not intended to solve all mereological problems: to understand how the fangs and tongue are both part of one entity I require not just a pure concept but an empirical one, <snake>. But it is the schema of magnitude which makes possible the composition of the spatio-temporal manifold and thus the representation of the segments of Figure  2 as 'one intuition'. 29 Kant summarizes the point in a 1792 letter to Beck:
Composition [Zusammensetzung] itself cannot be given by means of mere intuition and its apprehension, but only through the self-active combination of the manifold in intuition . . . this combination and its function must be subject to rules a priori in the mind, which constitute the pure thought of an object in general (the pure concept of the understanding), by which the apprehension of the manifold must be governed, insofar as it amounts to one intuition; furthermore, these a priori rules constitute the condition of all possible empirical cognition of the composite (or that which belongs to it). (Letter to J. S. Beck, 16 October 1792, Br Ak. XI 376)
An Assessment of Kant's Position
I want now to assess, philosophically and textually, the account which I have attributed to Kant in Sections 1-3; for convenience's sake I label this account 'X'. Recall, first, what I called the question of conceptualism: can perception represent empirical particulars in the absence of conceptual capacities? It seems that X strikes a plausible balance here. On the one hand, it allows an affirmative answer: an owl's consciousness, for example, will be biologically determined such that the 'basic measure' which it uses will automatically pick out entities of a certain size. Animals can thus possess conscious and immediate spatiotemporal representations of particulars while lacking the various intentional achievements which Kant holds depend on a consciousness of normativity: animal intentionality would not contain, for example, any distinction between successive perception and the perception of succession. 30 Kant himself makes exactly this point:
To make a concept, by means of an intuition, into a cognition of an object, is indeed the work of judgment; but the reference [Beziehung] of an intuition to an object generally is not. (Letter to J. S. Beck, 11 November 1791, Br Ak. XI 311) Admittedly, matters here are complicated by Kant's tendency to shift between weaker and stronger definitions of 'object' and related terms such as 'cognition'. 31 Nevertheless, the final clause of Kant's remark is clear enough and it fits precisely with my analysis: the reference of intuitions does not depend on conceptuality or judgment just as, within the Russellian example used above, the reference of 'Desdemona' and 'Cassio' is not dependent upon their satisfactory unification within a proposition (Russell 1912: 74) . On the other hand, however, X constitutes one portion of an extended transcendental argument for the legitimate application of the categories to intuition. This argument is directed primarily against Humean scepticism about the semantics of concepts not drawn from experience and the justification of propositions which are neither empirical nor definitional. 32 It is therefore vital that X shows that the relevant category, in this case magnitude, is a necessary condition for some comparatively basic perceptual achievement, an achievement which either Kant's opponents accept or to which he can plausibly argue from premises that they do accept. More specifically, Kant's argument is designed to establish to necessity of the categories with respect to:
[W]hatever objects may come before our senses, not as far as the form of their intuition, but rather as far as the laws of their combination [Verbindung] are concerned. (KrV: B159) 'Verbindung' is Kant's umbrella term for both the mode of composition [Zusammensetzung] characteristic of the mathematical categories and the connection [Verknüpfung] characteristic of the dynamical categories (KrV: B202n). In both cases, therefore, his claim is that 'the unity of the synthesis of the manifold' is dependent on the understanding: it is because of this basic similarity that Kant groups together the Axioms and the Analogies at B162-4. 33 With respect to X, specifically, Kant's transcendental argument is this. The synthesis of apprehension is the process by which the 'basic measure' is iterated or, equivalently, the process through which representations become conscious or, equivalently, the process through which I make an intuition into a perception (KrV: B162). Kant's claim is that 'the synthetic unity' of this process depends upon the 'category of quantity'. And the reason for this is that illustrated in Section 3: only the shift in semantic register, from intuition to concepts, allows the integration of the various 'basic measures'. This is, from Kant's dialectical perspective, a suitable transcendental argument precisely because the premise from which it begins, the ability needed to represent parts as parts of a whole, is one which his opponents regard as comparatively unproblematic. While the issue of Hume's mereology is a complex one, consider these remarks from the perspective of the argument outlined above:
That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. Now the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. The perception consists of parts. These parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thickness. (Hume 1978: 1.4.5.15) There is another very decisive argument, which establishes the present doctrine concerning our ideas of space and time, and is founded only on that simple principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of parts, which are indivisible. (Hume 1978: 1.2.3.12) The reference to 'compounding' here is precisely the operation which Kant identifies as 'composition' [Zusammensetzung]; the argument above, if valid, would show, contra Hume, that this capacity is dependent upon certain a priori conceptual abilities. As Falkenstein neatly put it in a recent paper, the problem for Hume, in its most basic form, is that he cannot explain how one might move from multiple simple impressions to the representation of their unity:
Suppose that four impressions, A, B, C, D, are arranged in the configuration of a square. According to Hume, each of these impressions is distinct and distinguishable and separable from all the others and constitutes, in effect, a distinct 'substance' in its own right, unrelated to any of the others (Treatise 1.4.5.5). Accordingly, no one of these impressions could be considered to be the impression of a square, or indeed of anything extended . . . But what, on Hume's account, makes a collection of four simple impressions disposed in the configuration of a square a compound impression of a square? . . . It cannot be just the bare fact of the contiguity of the impressions in space, for there can be a contiguity of impressions even where there is no compound impression of contiguity . . . If we say that a compound impression does not just consist of the four simple impressions disposed in the configuration of a square, but of an awareness of each of the four impressions and of their spatial relations to one another, then we need to explain what it means to be aware of a relation between a group of impressions. (Falkenstein 2005: 432 emphasis added).
Kant's claim is that nothing other than a second order capacity to represent our own representations, i.e. self-consciousness in the Critical sense of that phrase, can provide the answer. I have focused on perception but here, with the reference to self-consciousness, it is worth highlighting the full implications of the type of argument I have sketched. One familiar objection to the Humean model of consciousness is that it covertly assumes some thicker self responsible for the various operations, association for example, performed on the bundled perceptions. The natural Humean response is to argue that all such operations can be 'reduced', as Beauchamp put it, to facts about the perceptions themselves: for example, about the causal chains connecting them (Beauchamp 1979: 50) . Consider, for example, Pike's influential suggestion that self-consciousness can be captured within a Humean context simply by allowing impression A to be of itself (i.e. of A) standing in relation to representations B, C, and D just as a picture P might be of P itself and hanging next to three other pictures (Pike 1967: 162) . As Allison has recently emphasized, the difficulty with this move is that there remains no explanation as to how this would allow A to represent the unity of itself with the other impressions: it is no better, to return to Russell's example, than if I carefully inscribed the word 'Cassio' in such a way that one could, with a magnifying glass, detect minute versions of the words 'Cassio', 'loves', 'Desdemona' in the individual pen strokes (Allison 2008: 303) . The problem is that while Pike's model allows a superficial ascent to the second order in the sense that A is an impression of various other impressions, the basic type of content remains, from a Kantian perspective, at the level of consciousness not self-consciousness. Switching again to a linguistic context, precisely the same problem occurs in accounts such as Russell's Principles which attempts to explain unity by arguing that certain members of the 'list' are somehow both pieces of first order content and yet explain the unification of such content (Russell 1903: § §52-5) . To adapt an example from Linsky, Russell's claim would be that the individual impressions, A, B, C, D of the four sides of the square add up to a representation of the square as a whole precisely because at least one of the impressions, A perhaps, plays a special 'double role' as a constituent to be unified, on the one hand, and as a unifier of constituents on the other (Linsky 1992: 273) . The problem, as Linsky observes, is that Russell is unable to explain how one type of content can perform both tasks. Kant's response would be that it cannot: thus the need for a fundamental distinction between intuition and apperception. Kant, of course, deploys multiple arguments against multiple forms of empiricism. The benefit of emphasizing mereology, as I have done in presenting X, is that Kant is able to begin, exactly as he tries to do in the Second Analogy, from a premise which Hume thought unproblematic: the capacity to 'compound' parts or the capacity to represent events. In contrast, those arguments which begin from, say, the capacity to conceptualize or to judge and move from there to the categories risk simply begging the question since Hume does not believe that we need to posit judgments in Kant's distinctive sense of the term. 34 Here I agree with Ginsborg that readings on which the categories are necessary only for modes of experience more sophisticated than those recognized by the empiricists risk trivializing Kant's project by leaving the empiricist account of perception untouched (Ginsborg 2006: 62) . What my approach offers is a careful balance. On the one hand, it shows the understanding to be necessary for perceptual representation as Hume himself understood it. Chang, in a recent article, has defended an account of certain a priori metaphysical principles based on their analytic connection to various epistemic activities: for example, 'if we want to engage in the activity of counting, then we have to presume that the things we are trying to count are discrete' (Chang 2008: 122) . Kant's claim, in contrast, is that because we represent things as discrete (Section 2) it follows that we must engage in the activity of counting if we wish to unify them (Section 3). X thus provides what is, prima facie at least, a viable transcendental argument. On the other hand, however, X also offers a satisfactory solution to the textual problem of animal cognition: it entails that individual intuitions can occur, as in Figures 1 and 2 , in beings, such as animals, which lack all conceptual capacities. More broadly, X resolves the problem of perceptual atomism: as noted in Section 2, Kant is simply not committed to the claim that, in representing a circle, I necessarily represent one part after another. X also sheds some light on the relationship between the imagination and understanding. It highlights, for example, why Kant is insistent on keeping the two faculties separate-the transition from Figure 1 to Figure 2 which is explained by imagination can occur in agents lacking conceptual capacities. Finally, it illustrates how the understanding may be said to 'appropriate' or govern the imagination: as seen in the case of the 'savage', the choice of basic measure, i.e. the choice of the unit of apprehension may or may not be determined by an agent's conceptual capacities, which thus may or may not function as a 'rule for apprehension '. 35 There are, of course, texts in which Kant appears to defend a less plausible set of claims than those which I have attributed to him. Consider this:
I cannot represent to myself any line, no matter how small it may be, without drawing it in thought, i.e. gradually generating all its parts from one point [von einem Punkte alle Theile nach und nach zu erzeugen] and thereby first sketching this intuition. It is exactly the same with even the smallest time. I think therein only the successive progress from one moment to another [den successiven Fortgang von einem Augenblick zum andern], where through all parts of time and their addition a determinate magnitude of time is finally generated. (KrV: A162-3/B203) Call this passage 'Y'. I have argued that the categories are necessary for the unification of the various moments of consciousness or 'basic measures'. In Y, however, Kant claims that to represent any spatial extent, 'no matter how small it may be', I must first represent its parts. This is problematic since, in virtue of the quanta continua assumption, such subdivision may be extended indefinitely, so implying an endless regress. I want to explain why I believe Y is confused. Kant has a tendency to treat any determinate spatial perception on the model of the 'vast line' example in Section 3: that is, as the perception of an object whose size exceeds the 'basic measure' being used and thus where conceptual unification is necessary simply for perception of that object. In the Prolegomena for example, he maintains that that 'which determines space to assume the form of a circle . . . is the understanding, so far as it contains the ground of the unity of [its] construction' (Prol.: 321-2). What Kant is effectively doing here is retaining the idea of the 'basic measure', as he must do if he is to avoid an endless decompositional regress, but assuming that the measure is necessarily smaller than the object to be represented, namely the circle: as a result the categories are required even to perceive that object. 36 In texts such as Y, this assumption about the relative size of the 'basic measure' vis-à-vis the object is smuggled in via the reference to 'drawing' or 'gradually generating': insofar as time arises from the iteration of the basic measure, any object 'gradually generated' over time will necessarily be one represented by multiple basic measures. The unification of these basic measures will then, in line with X, depend on the category of magnitude. But there is simply no reason to accept the claim that most perception fits this 'vast line' model: if it did, an animal could not perceive the circle. Moving beyond Y, there are other texts in which Kant seems to make a stronger claim that the ones defended in X. The famous footnote at B160-1, for example, can plausibly be read as arguing that the unity of the pure forms of intuition themselves, as distinct from and prior to the unity of determinate spatio-temporal magnitudes, depends on the understanding. 37 Call this footnote 'Z'. Both the acceptance and the rejection of the claims made in Z will be compatible with X, provided simply that Z's accept-ance does not rule out the possibility of animals possessing intuition. This provision will almost certainly be met since the obvious way to motivate Z is to argue that apperception is necessary for some comparatively sophisticated awareness of spatio-temporal unity, one which an animal might lack while still being able to see a rock, say, in front of it: apperception would, for example, plausibly be necessary to distinguish between successive perception and the perception of succession.
I want to close by looking directly at four aspects of X itself which demand substantive, further development; I suggest that the natural place to look for such developments is the phenomenological tradition. First, Kant's argument against the possibility of the simultaneous perception of, say, two ships in the absence of the categories rests on a trilemma: either (i) the basic measure is smaller than a single ship in which case one cannot even represent one ship in a single moment, or (ii) it is the same size as a single ship in which case one cannot represent both ships at a single moment, or (iii) it is large enough to encompass both ships in which case while they are represented, one is not conscious of them since 'as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity' (KrV: A99). The question is whether a more developed phenomenological mereology might challenge (iii). Could I, for example, be conscious of the spatial subcomponent of the basic measure in virtue of their distinctive colours? Kant is unable to address this question adequately in part because of a fundamental difficulty regarding the status of colour within his theory, one which has been widely discussed in relation to KU's 'formalist aesthetics': simply put, is colour an aspect of the form of perception or merely of its matter? The issue is further complicated by the notorious textual difficulties surrounding the remarks on Euler and 'pure colour' at KU 224. 38 I cannot address those issues here; my point is that the obvious place to start to do so would be with a phenomenological mereology such as that set out in the third of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen. The second issue concerns the status of reproduction. Kant, in line with authors such as Wolff and Baumgarten, defines the imagination as the capacity to represent objects in their absence. 39 One can see why memory might then be treated as a subset of such a capacity. But can this supposed connection between memory and the imagination be further developed? The phenomenological tradition's notion of a 'horizon' [Horizont] offers one potential avenue. Heidegger's Kant commentary, for example, analyses memory in terms of 'a horizon of the past' and 'horizon' in terms of an 'image anticipated in imagination'; Heidegger thus explains memory's connection to the imagination by reference to the latter's other traditional role as the faculty of images. 40 Third, what are the implications, if any, for Kant's notion of explanatory priority given the fact that both Figures 1 and 2 can occur independently of conceptual intentionality and are necessary conditions on it? Husserl's Erfahrung und Urteil, for example, seeks to provide a 'genealogy of logic', demonstrating how conceptual and predicative intentionality emerges from, and so depends upon, a pre-predicative and typically associative base: for Husserl the Analytic is thus 'founded on' the Aesthetic (Husserl 1978: 291-2) . But what should be Kant's view of such projects, and of their attendant notion of explanatory priority? Fourth, I have argued that Kant explains the unity of perception by appeal to concepts. This raises the obvious question: what explains concepts? Kant's answer is, at least prima facie, the capacity to form judgments: thus 'we can . . . trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments' (KrV: A69/B94). One striking feature of the recent analytic literature has been an attempt, however, to separate conceptualization from judgmental or propositional intentionality: to take one prominent example, McDowell has recently retracted his earlier model of human experience in favour of the view that such experience contains concepts but not judgments (McDowell 2009: 260-8) . The obvious difficulty in assessing such a proposal is to work out what exactly the difference between conceptual and judgmental or propositional intentionality amounts to. In particular, one needs to avoid trivializing the debate by equating judgmental intentionality with, say, an explicit awareness either of the act of judgment or of the content of the predicates used. This trivializes the issue because Kant, and surely all other parties to the debate, are well aware that such awareness is unusual and derivative. 41 What I want to suggest is that if this debate is to be well-formed one needs to understand why Kant thinks that conceptuality must be explained via judgment. As noted in Section 1, Kant analyses concepts in terms of the consciousness of normativity. Crucially, he then analyses the ability to represent norms in terms of the table of judgments or, in modern language, in terms of the logical constants. Unlike in Frege, say, the Kantian quantifiers, for example, are not themselves concepts, second order or otherwise: that would make the putative explanation of conceptuality circular. Rather, the logical constants define the range of normative relations which we can establish between pieces of semantic content; the universal, affirmative, categorical form, for example, is a 'rule' which relates two concepts, F and G, by requiring that I, and presumptively all other rational, sensible agents, must apply G to anything to which F is applied. 42 The forms of judgment thus define the basic structure of the understanding, i.e. of the capacity to represent 'rules': as such, they constitute 'pure, general logic' for Kant. 43 Furthermore, since they are themselves defined in abstraction from all semantic content, this logic is, as MacFarlane has recently emphasized, 'without all content and merely formal' [bloß formalen]. 44 This is not a trivial thesis as one can see by noting that, unsurprisingly given his treatment of quantification, Frege in contrast accepts that logic 'has its own concepts' and so 'is not at all formal' (Frege 1906: 428 ). Kant's theory of judgment is thus, simultaneously, a theory of intentionality, a theory of syntax, a theory of logic, a theory of form, and his explanation of the rational agent's unique capacity to represent normativity: it is, as Kant puts it, the 'universal grammar' for understanding (Log.: 13) . The result of this is as follows. If one is to engage with Kant's argument for the dependence of concepts on judgment, one needs to unpick the connections he postulates between the concepts of logic, of formality, of grammar and, fundamentally, of the capacity for what Heidegger calls 'free, self-binding', the ability to self-prescribe normative connections among my representations (Heidegger 1997b: 255 Natorp 1910 : 276-7 or Cassirer 1907 Any adequate textual survey would need to consider, at the bare minimum, the following texts within the Transcendental Analytic alone: KrV: A50-1/B74-6, A69/B94, A77-8/ B103, A79/B104-5, A89-90/B122-3, A93/B126, A112, A118-20, B129-30, B137-8, B145, B160-4. There are, in addition, numerous relevant passages in works from the logic lectures to the third Critique: I draw on several of these in what follows. As stated, however, I do not believe that any purely textual survey, no matter how extensive, will resolve the matter until the underlying structural question is addressed.
5 On optical illusions see, for example, Crane 1992. For a superb treatment of the connection between concepts and the syllogistic structure in Kant see Longuenesse 1998: 90-3 . I return to the broader issue of the connection between conceptual and judgmental or propositional intentionality in Section 4.
6 For example Log.: 33, 64; SvF: 59; KU: 464n; V-Lo/Dohna: 702; V-MP/Heinze: 275-7; V-MP/Mron: 878-85; V-MP/Volckmann: 449-50; V-MP-L1/Pölitz: 275-7. My claim is not that texts such as these are entirely unambiguous: many are obscured by the lack of a clear distinction between inner sense, consciousness and apperception (compare V-Lo/Wiener: 845-6 with KrV: A320/B376-7 or Log.: 64). But it seems that the general position is clear: ultimately, once it is conceded that animals perceive it is hard to see what the content of those perceptions could be other than objects of outer sense.
